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Prospective memory is remembering to perform an action in the future when a 
cue is presented. However, processes involved in remembering the future intention (i.e., 
preparatory attentional processes) might hinder performance on activities leading up to 
and surrounding the event in which an intention must be carried out. The current study 
was designed to assess whether young children who engage in prospective memory do so 
at a cost to current cognitive processing. Four-, 5-, and 6-year old children either 
performed a simple ongoing selection task only (control condition) or performed the 
selection task with an embedded prospective memory task (experimental condition). 
Results demonstrated that children in the experimental condition slowed down in phase 
two due relative to children in the control condition. The results are discussed in terms of 
the development of executive functioning and more specifically, how working memory 
and speed of processing my play a role in the cost imposed to an ongoing task by a 
prospective memory task.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 Executive functions are the processes involved in directing attention, and 
subsequently deciding what to do with the information gathered by those attentional 
processes (Bjorklund, 2000). For example, when driving a car, individuals must attend to 
oncoming traffic, road signs and traffic lights. Therefore, to attend to all relevant 
information and perform the appropriate actions at the correct time (e.g., stop pressing the 
accelerator to press the brake), individuals must use executive function processes to 
switch their attention. However, a task such as driving becomes more complex when 
individuals must divide their attention by focusing on a concurrent task, like driving and 
talking on a cell phone. Executive functions play an important role in individuals’ ability 
to switch between tasks while holding information and goals in mind. 
Executive function is often discussed in relation to models of working memory. 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed a working memory model, in which they 
maintained that attentional control and memory maintenance play an important role in 
complex cognition. According to Baddeley and Hitch, working memory allows one to 
hold a certain amount of information in mind at once, but to collect that information, one 
must first direct and maintain their attention towards the source. Norman and Shallice 
(1986; Shallice, 1988) suggested that a supervisory attentional system may be responsible 
for gathering, maintaining, and using information held in working memory, and is 
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activated when individuals need to override a prepotent response.  In the driving 
example, one may typically turn right on a certain road, but to reach the intended 
destination on this occasion, the individual must turn left instead. WM also aids in goal 
and representation maintenance, as well as allowing for one to hold in mind action plans 
to complete goals.  
 Working memory is thought to be a multi-dimensional construct (Engle & Kane, 
2004). Engle and Kane contended that there are three main components of working 
memory: (a) long-term memory traces that are stored in short term representational 
formats that are active above threshold, (b) strategies to raise and maintain activation 
above threshold levels, and (c) executive attentional processes, which are responsible for 
individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC).  The processes involved in 
executive attention allow for individuals to attend to information that is relevant to the 
goal under conditions of interference.  
Engle and Kane (2004) suggested that WMC is a domain general ability and is 
predictive of performance on higher-order cognitive tasks.  According to Engle and Kane, 
WMC is an enduring trait of an individual and the source of individual differences on 
tasks requiring executive attention and higher order functions.  Engle and Kane suggested 
that WMC and higher-order cognition may be predictive of individuals’ ability to allocate 
attentional resources strategically.  In this view, those with high span working memory 
are more skilled at allocating attention between storage and processing components than 
those who have low span working memory.  Low span individuals may not be able to 
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adjust their attentional resource allocation strategies to compensate for the increase in 
processing load. 
Attentional processes and working memory are important when individuals must 
combat interference from irrelevant distractors (Kane & Engle, 2003).  Yet, daily 
activities often require that we allocate attention to multiple tasks at once, where 
distractors are irrelevant in regard to one goal but pertinent to another goal.  Therefore, it 
is important to examine how performance on individual tasks is affected when the tasks 
must be performed concurrently.   
Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, and Anderson (1996) examined how divided 
attention impacted encoding and retrieval processes.  Participants were given an auditory 
memory task with each word followed by an arithmetic task, used to eliminate recency 
effects. After the task, participants were asked to recall the list of words in any order. In 
addition, participants were given a continuous reaction-time (CRT) task. The CRT task 
consisted of a visual display on a computer screen and required participants to make a 
manual response on a keyboard.  Four boxes were arranged horizontally on a screen, with 
an asterisk appearing randomly in one of the boxes.  Participants were instructed to press 
a corresponding key as quickly as possible. The CRT task was performed during the 
encoding, recall, or both encoding and recall portion of the memory task. There was also 
a control group who performed the memory task only. Craik et al. found that reaction 
times on the CRT task were impaired when participants had to divide their attention 
during retrieval rather than during encoding. They concluded that though retrieval and 
encoding processes were both impacted when given the concurrent CRT task, retrieval 
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processes are more impaired than encoding processes. In general, this finding 
demonstrates how the cognitive processing of concurrent tasks is detrimental to one or 
both tasks. 
Divided attention is inherent in prospective memory tasks where participants are 
instructed to perform an action in the future (Smith, 2006). For example, individuals 
might have to remember to stop to get gas and thus, interrupt their attention toward 
driving to remember to get gas. There has been some debate in the prospective memory 
literature whether performance on the ongoing task is hindered when individuals are 
given a concurrent prospective memory task (i.e., there is a cost to the ongoing task). 
Perhaps participants do not need to maintain the intention in working memory allowing 
participants to allocate attentional resources only when the cue for the prospective memory 
task is presented. In this case, there should be no cost to the ongoing task. Alternatively, 
participants may need to maintain the intention in working memory and thus allocate 
resources to the intention held in working memory as well as to performance on the 
ongoing task. From this perspective, performance on the ongoing task will be impaired. 
 Event-based prospective memory is remembering to perform an action in the future 
(McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). A number of event-based prospective memory frameworks 
maintain that a representation of both the event and the action are made when forming an 
intention to perform the delayed intention task (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Guynn, 
McDaniel, & Einstein, 2000) and then the cue for the prospective memory action should 
elicit the prospective memory action to be performed. McDaniel and Einstein suggest that 
event-based prospective memory requires attentional processes when the cue is 
presented, not throughout the ongoing task. 
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 Similarly, Gollwitzer (1999) proposed that individuals form self-instructions that 
pair the goal with the implementation intention. These are similar to if-then plans (e.g., if 
I see the store on the way home, I should remember to pick up milk).  Henderson, 
Gollwitzer, and Oettingen (2007) describe implementation intentions as mental 
associations that are formed between specific situations and goal-directed responses for 
those situations. The mental association formed in implementation intentions makes goal-
directed behavior a more automatic and efficient process. The automaticity of 
implementation intentions are attributed to the lack of conscious intent needed to 
maintain the goal over time.  Instead, when a critical situation is presented, the intention 
for the goal-directed behavior is elicited. The ideas presented by Gollwitzer (1999) and 
McDaniel and Einstein (2000) are consistent in that when individuals form a 
representation or implementation intentions, the future intention does not require 
resources and should not affect ongoing task performance. 
 Webb and Sheeran (2004) have examined the effects of implementation intentions 
on cue detection.  In Experiment 1, they had two implementation intention conditions and 
three control conditions.  In the implementation intention conditions, participant were 
instructed to form the following plans – “when I see an F, I should add one to my count” 
or “when I see an F, I will count it on my fingers.” Participants were asked to repeat these 
instructions to themselves and fully commit themselves to the plan. The control groups 
were not told to form if-then self-instructions, but were told to either count the F’s to 
themselves, to count the F’s on their fingers, or to familiarize themselves with the trial 
sentence for 30 seconds (to ensure that performance was not due to practice or rehearsal 
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effects). These conditions were in place to make sure that counting on one’s fingers did 
not make one count more F’s or that a period of rehearsal could not account for the 
increase in the number of F’s counted. As predicted, more F’s were counted in the 
implementation condition. In Experiment 2,Webb and Sheeran examined the extent to 
which an ongoing task was affected when one formed these implementation intentions. 
To test this hypothesis, they instructed participants to press the Z key when a single digit 
appeared on a computer screen and the M key when multiple digits appeared.  After a 
practice phase, half the participants were told to form an implementation intention to 
press the Z key particularly fast when “3” appeared by itself on a computer screen. The 
remaining participants were told to stare at a “3” for 15 seconds but were not instructed to 
make an implementation intention. After these instructions, participants were 
administered the task. As expected, participants who formed an implementation intention 
were faster at responding to the “3” than any other of the stimuli.  Contrary to 
Gollwitzer’s (1999) claim that when an implementation intention is formed the process 
becomes automatic, Webb and Sheeran found that participants who formed these 
implementation intentions had slower responses on all other number stimuli compared to 
the control condition.  Therefore, even when one forms an implementation intention, 
individuals must divide their attention between performing the ongoing task and 
monitoring the ongoing task for the cue, resulting in slow performance on the ongoing 
task. 
Prospective Memory in Children 
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 Understanding how prospective memory develops in children is important for 
many reasons.  First of all, it provides a foundation for how these processes develop into 
adulthood. Under this model, judgement can be made about the nature of the processes 
involved in performing a prospective memory task.  For instance, processes such as EF 
that adults use to perform a prospective memory task may be relatively undeveloped in 
children.  By understanding the disparity between the capabilities of children and of 
adults, it can be better understood what processes are essential for optimal performance 
on a prospective memory task. 
 A number of studies on prospective memory in children have been conducted, 
examining various factors that may influence prospective memory performance.  The 
factors include the setting of the experiment (e.g., experimental or naturalistic), the use of 
memory aids, and how the ongoing task affects performance on the prospective memory 
task.  
Somerville, Wellman, and Cultice (1983) focused on children’s prospective 
memory performance in a naturalistic setting. Mothers of 2-, 3-, and 4-year-old children 
were instructed to have their children remind them to do something of either high or low 
interest in the future. Researchers found that all age groups performed poorly (less than 
40% recall) in the low interest group, while all children in the high interest condition 
performed equally well (80% recall), which implies that prospective memory is evident 
in highly motivated individuals as early as 2 years of age. 
In a more controlled study, Guarjardo and Best (2000) examined prospective 
memory in 3- and 5-year-old children. Subjects were given a computerized prospective 
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memory task, and participated in both the “no cue” and the “external cue” condition (e.g., 
when the target picture was a duck, children could choose a picture of a duck, a boat or a 
umbrella as a reminder). Children were shown 6 blocks of 10 pictures and were told that 
they will need to recall as many pictures as they could at the end of the task.  The 
children were also instructed to press the space bar every time they saw the target picture 
(e.g., house or duck). As expected, Guarjardo and Best found that 5-year-olds were more 
successful on the prospective memory task than 3-year-olds, even when children were 
given an external memory aid. Importantly, when asked about the prospective memory 
instructions at the end of the task, 3-year olds had difficulty recalling the instructions.  
This finding suggests that successful completion of a prospective memory task consists of 
two different memory processes: prospective and retrospective memory.  The prospective 
process involves forming an intention to perform a future action. However, to carry out 
the intention, one must retrospectively recall the cue and the action (Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1990, 1996). 
 In another study, Kliegel and Jager (2007) investigated prospective memory in 
preschoolers ranging from 2 to 6 years of age. In the ongoing task, children were shown 
ten cards of common objects and were asked to name each object. The ongoing task was 
conducted three times with a prospective target (i.e., an apple) occurring on the 8th trial in 
the first block, the 6th trial in the second block, and the 9th trial in the third block. 
Children were instructed to place the apple card in a box located behind them. In the 
memory aid condition, an actual apple was placed on the table as a reminder. In the no 
memory aid condition, children did not receive a reminder. Kliegel and Jager found that 
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4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds performed significantly better than 3-year-olds, who were 
significantly better than 2-year-olds. Although there was a main effect of memory aid, 
they did not find an interaction between age and memory aid conditions. Lastly, 2-year-
old’s did not display significant levels of prospective memory, even for participants who 
were successful on the retrospective memory task. Importantly, Kleigel and Jagar’s 
prospective memory task required children to interrupt the ongoing task to perform the 
prospective memory task successfully.   
Task interruption has been demonstrated to influence success on prospective 
memory performance in children. Kvavilashvili, Messer, and Ebdon (2001) instructed 4 -, 
5-, and 7-year-old children to name the pictures on four decks of 20 cards and were told 
to hide the prospective memory target card in a special box. The prospective memory 
target in one condition was the 10th card in each deck while in the other condition the 
prospective memory card was the 20th card. Kvavilashvili et al. reasoned that task 
interruption was required for the target card in the 10th position, but not in the 20th 
position because it would be obvious to the child that there were no cards left. Results 
showed that children’s prospective memory performance was indeed better when the 
prospective memory target was in the 20th position rather than the 10th position.  
Kvavilashvili et al. suggested that controlled attentional process are limited and must be 
allocated to card naming for the duration of the task.  On the 10th trial, children are 
engaged in the card naming task and do not have resources to detect the prospective 
memory task.  Yet, on the 20th trial, there are no more cards, freeing up resources and 
allowing children to remember to perform the prospective memory action. Therefore, to 
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complete the prospective memory task successfully on the 10th trial, one must elicit the 
proper inhibitory control mechanisms. Inhibitory control is thought to be an executive 
function, in which one has to inhibit an established prepotent response to perform the 
ongoing task.  On the 10th trial in this task, children would have to inhibit their tendency 
to continue the ongoing task to perform the prospective memory action. Kvavilashvili et 
al.’s results are consistent with the findings of Kerns (2000) who contended that 
inhibitory mechanisms must be present for one to interrupt the ongoing behavior or task 
to allow for other intended actions. Kvavlashvili et al. argued that a task requiring 
minimal attentional resources would maximize children’s performance on a prospective 
memory task because resources could be allocated to ongoing task interruption. 
Ongoing Task Performance Costs 
Attempts have been made to identify the mechanisms involved in prospective 
memory performance and how these mechanisms develop with age. Most research has 
been focused on prospective memory performance (e.g., Kvavilashvili et al., 2001) rather 
than the cost to ongoing task performance. However, there is evidence in adult 
populations that ongoing task performance suffers when a secondary prospective memory 
task is incorporated (e.g., Anderson, Craik, and Naveh-Benjamin, 1998; Craik et al., 
1996; Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell, & Mayhorn, 1997; Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 
2007).  Assessing ongoing task performance is important for many reasons.  Though 
success on a prospective memory task may be a goal of the individual, successful 
performance on activities leading up to and surrounding the prospective memory task is 
also important. Secondly, assessing ongoing task performance when given a concurrent 
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prospective memory goal serves as a measurement of the resources required to perform 
the prospective memory task by examining the resources that are no longer available for 
the ongoing task alone.  
Park and colleagues (1997) argued that event-based prospective memory tasks 
may not be automatic as claimed by Einstein and McDaniel (1996) but effortful such that 
performance on an ongoing task is hindered.  In this study, younger and older adults 
performed both a time-based prospective memory task (i.e., remembering to perform an 
action at or after a certain amount of time has passed) and an event-based prospective 
memory task. In Experiment 1, the ongoing task was a recall task. Participants were 
shown words against a patterned background and were told to monitor continuously so 
that they remember the last three words. Throughout the task, when participants saw the 
word “RECALL,” they were to say aloud the last three words they saw. The event-based 
prospective memory task was that the participant would press the “0” key when a specific 
pattern appeared as the background (e.g., different plaid backgrounds). In Experiment 2, 
participants were given the same ongoing working memory task, but were instead given a 
time-based prospective memory task to perform (e.g., to pull a lever every 1-2 minutes). 
The findings suggested that both event-based and time-based prospective memory 
required allocation of cognitive resources, which posed a cost to the ongoing task, 
although the cost seemed to be more pronounced for event-based prospective memory. 
The authors speculated that two different processes may be involved.  Event-based 
prospective memory may require more continuous attention, while time-based 
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prospective memory requires a central executive component to disengage from the 
ongoing task in a timely manner. 
In a similar study, Smith (2003) also challenged the assumption that event-based 
prospective memory is an automatic process. Adult participants were given two blocks of 
a lexical decision task, where they were shown a string of letters and asked to press the Y 
key if the string was a word and the N key if the string was not a word. Participants in the 
experimental condition performed the second block with the additional requirement of an 
event-based prospective memory task. Specifically, these participants were given a list of 
six words to memorize and were instructed to press the space bar as soon as any of these 
words appeared. Participants in the control group were given the prospective memory 
instructions but were told that they would not need to follow those instructions for the 
current task. Smith found participants in the control condition had shorter response 
latencies when completing the lexical decision task in the second block, which was 
attributed to practice effects. Conversely, participants in the experimental condition had 
longer response latencies in the second block, suggesting that prospective memory 
requires an allocation of resources, which negatively affects performance on the ongoing 
task.  Smith suggested that the allocation of resources when performing an event-based 
prospective memory task occurs because one is engaging in preparatory attentional 
processes.  
The PAM (Preparatory Attentional and Memory processes) theory contends that 
these attentional processes are not automatic (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2005; Smith, 
Hunt, McVay, & McConnell, 2007), but may be outside conscious awareness. In other 
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words, an individual must maintain a state of readiness during the ongoing task and 
individuals must monitor the ongoing task for the cues related to the prospective memory 
task to retrieve the intention successfully and perform the action (Einstein & McDaniel, 
2005; Smith, 2003).  Because individuals must monitor - consciously or unconsciously - 
the ongoing task for the prospective memory cue, their performance on the ongoing task 
should suffer. 
There is disagreement about the extent to which these preparatory attentional 
processes are involved. The multiprocess framework (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) 
proposes that under certain circumstances, prospective memory should be automatic, 
posing no cost to the ongoing task.  These conditions include when: (a) the action 
associated with the intention is simple, (b) the action and target are sufficiently encoded 
in relation to each other, (c) the ongoing task requires that one process the relevant 
dimension of the target, and (d) the target is salient. To test whether salience of the target 
event decreased the cost to the prospective memory to the ongoing task, Smith et al. 
(2007) employed the same design as the Smith (2003) study; however, targets were used 
that were perceptually or personally salient to individuals. Throughout four experiments, 
Smith et al. (2007) demonstrated that salient events, such as recognizing one’s own name, 
still slowed performance on the ongoing task compared to participants who were not 
given the prospective memory intentions. Smith et al. interpreted these findings as 
evidence against the multi-process framework, which suggests that under certain 
conditions, prospective memory intentions are automatic, rather than effortful. 
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Interestingly, Smith and Bayen (2005) found that WMC predicts the extent to 
which one is engaged in preparatory attentional processes. Smith and Bayen used a 
counting span task to measure WMC. After the counting span task, participants were 
given a sentence verification task with an embedded prospective memory task.  In the 
sentence verification task, participants were instructed to respond by pressing the Y key 
on the keyboard when they thought the sentence was true, and to press the N key when 
false.  The embedded prospective memory task required participants to press the F1 key 
when they saw any of four specific words.  Smith and Bayen found that participants with 
higher span scores were more likely than those with low span scores to engage in 
preparatory attentional processes (i.e., exhibited greater cost to the ongoing task).  
Further, they found that retrospective memory performance that underlies prospective 
memory performance, measured by recalling the prospective memory targets at the end 
of the task, was not affected by span performance. However, in Experiment 2, Smith and 
Bayen found that when increasing the complexity of the sentence verification task by 
instructing participants to remember the last word in each sentence, accuracy differences 
emerged between high and low span participants.  In particular, high spans tended to 
respond correctly to more sentences and recalled more ending words than did low spans.  
Smith and Bayen suggested that counting span measure actually taps into one’s ability to 
divide their attention and the control of attentional processes.  Therefore, the ability to 
engage in preparatory attentional processes successfully and complete a prospective 
memory task may be accounted for by individuals’ ability to allocate their attention. 
Certainly, this finding is counterintuitive, as one would expect that those with greater 
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WMC would be less impaired because they have a greater number of cognitive resources. 
However, it seems that individuals who have greater WMCs have more resources to 
allocate to preparatory attentional processes. 
Overall, these studies (i.e., Park et al., 1997; Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2005; 
Smith et al., 2007) provide compelling evidence for the claim that event-based 
prospective memory requires the allocation of attentional resources. However, this 
finding has only been demonstrated in adult populations. In children, the cost of the 
ongoing task imposed by a prospective memory task has not been explored. It could be 
that because children have less attentional resources than adults, children may not 
demonstrate costs in the way that adults do for a variety of reasons.  For instance, young 
children may be relatively unaware of their cognitive processes compared to adults. Even 
though adults still demonstrate a cost to an ongoing task when given prospective memory 
instructions, they have more control over their attentional resources because they are able 
to allocate their attention strategically.  Children lack sufficient control over their 
attention and may unconsciously allocate attention to prospective memory even when 
unnecessary.  If so, children will demonstrate a greater cost to an ongoing task, which 
should decrease with age into adulthood. Smith (2003) and Smith et al. (2007) argued 
that the processes involved in successful prospective memory performance require 
attentional resources. Though individuals may not consciously be aware of that they are 
allocating attentional resources towards a target, they still experience a cost to other 
ongoing activities. The current study will examine the cost of prospective memory to the 
ongoing task performance in young children. If children do engage in preparatory 
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attentional processes, their ongoing task performance should be impaired through slower 
response times or lower accuracy on the ongoing task. As children age, their cognitive 
capacity increases (Manis, Keating, & Morrison, 1980) and there is an improvement in 
the efficiency and automaticity in which children are able to allocate their available 
resources. If children do engage in these attentional processes, older children should have 
greater resources to divide between the two concurrent tasks (i.e., ongoing task and 
prospective memory task) and should be less impaired by preparatory attentional 
processes. 
A secondary focus of the current study is to assess whether cognitive resources 
may “free up” after successful execution of the prospective memory task. After 
successful completion of a prospective memory task, children may become faster and 
more accurate on the ongoing task. This is consistent with the notion that children are 
holding a representation in mind until the task is completed, but would be counter to the 
expectation that latencies will be slower due to a heightened sensitivity to the prospective 
memory instructions (e.g., Einstein & McDaniel, 2004).  Einstein and McDaniel found 
that when an interruption (i.e., a prospective memory task) to the ongoing task was 
introduced, there appeared to be task-switching costs resulting in a cost to accuracy, 
rather than response latency.  Assessing this issue in children will aid in understanding 
the demands of a prospective memory task on children and how their resources are 
affected even after the successful completion of the task. 
To test these hypotheses, 4-, 5- and 6-year-old children received a computerized 
selection task in phase 1. The selection task served as the ongoing task, requiring 
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participants to press either animal or food pictures. In phase 2, participants received the 
computerized selection task again. Participants in the experimental condition received 
additional instructions for a prospective memory task that required participants to 
perform a unique action when a special picture appeared, whereas children in the control 
condition only performed the ongoing task. Also, to examine the “free up” hypothesis, 
children were told that they would only see the prospective memory target once.   
To summarize, children in the experimental condition should demonstrate a cost 
to the ongoing task, with younger children experiencing a greater cost than older 
children. The secondary hypothesis was that after children in the experimental condition 
have completed the prospective memory task, they should no longer demonstrate a cost to 
the remaining trials on the ongoing task because they no longer have to allocate 
attentional resources to a secondary task.  In addition, this study also allows for the 
examination of accuracy as a measure of ongoing task performance when given a 
prospective memory task which may be a more sensitive measure of younger children’s 
performance under divided attention conditions.   
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
 
 
Participants and Design 
Ninety-seven 4-, 5-, and 6-year-old children were tested. There were 35 4-year-
olds (M age = 4.5 years, SD = 0.3, 17 girls), 30 5-year-olds (M = 5.5, SD = 0.3, 16 girls), 
and 32 6-year-olds (M = 6.3, SD = 0.2, 16 girls). Eight children were excluded from the 
analyses (seven 4-year olds and one 6-year old). The sample was approximately 80% 
Caucasian, 17% African American, and 3% other/unknown. Half of the participants in 
each age group were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: prospective memory or 
control condition.  The picture category and the location of the pictures were 
counterbalanced between children.  Children either received instructions to press food or 
animal pictures in the ongoing task and half the children saw the two pictures arranged, 
as in figure 1a, while the remaining children saw the mirror image of the picture 
arrangement. 
Materials 
The task was conducted on a Dell Latitude D600 laptop computer with a Keytec 
touch screen, and programmed with SuperLab Pro. The stimuli consisted of computer 
images of animals (approximate size: 7 x 7.6 cm), food items (approximate size: 7 x 7.6 
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cm), and a smiley face (5.1 x 6.4 cm). There were 15 different food items and 15 
different animal pictures (Figure 1a).   
Procedure 
 Phase 1 Training. Children were trained on the selection task.  The children were 
instructed to touch pictures from one category (food items or animals).  Children were 
then asked what type of pictures they should touch and were reminded until the question 
was answered correctly. The three practice trials were programmed such that the correct 
pictures had to be selected by the child to complete the training.   
Phase 1 Testing. In phase 1, each child completed 15 trials that were in the same 
order across all children (see Figure 1a).  Each trial consisted of a screen with an animal 
and food picture beside one another.  Between the two pictures at the top of the screen 
was a smiley face picture (see Figure 1b).  
Phase 2 Training.  Children in the experimental condition were instructed that 
they will be playing the computer game again, but this time they were also told that when 
they see a special picture (i.e., duck for the animal category or apple for the food 
category) they should not touch the picture, but instead touch the smiley face at the top of 
the screen. The children were then shown a screen identical to the one that would be seen 
in phase 2 of testing with the duck and apple. The experimenter touched the smiley face 
to demonstrate the action the children should perform. Each child was told that it was 
very important that they remember to press the smiley when they saw the special picture 
because they would only see it once. They were then asked how many times they would 
see the special picture and reminded by the experimenter if the child was not able to
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Figure 1a. Stimuli used for each trial. 
 
          Trial 1      Trial 9 
                    
 
         Trial 2        Trial 10 
                                 
Trial 3      Trial 11 
                       
Trial 4      Trial 12 
                        
Trial 5         Trial 13 
                                
Trial 6       Trial 14 
                            
Trial 7       Trial 15 
                          
Trial 8 
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Figure 1b. Example trial showing how pictures were displayed for each trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
answer the question correctly. Children in the control condition were told only that they 
will continue to play the selection game and reminded of the instructions from phase 1. 
Phase 2 Testing.  All children received 15 trials in the same order as phase 1. 
Note that the apple and duck screen appeared on the 12th trial. 
 
22 
 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
Preliminary analyses revealed no main effects of selection task (animal or food 
pictures), placement (left vs. right) of stimuli, or sex, nor interactions of these variables 
with any other variables. Thus, these variables will not be considered further.  
Performance on the prospective memory task. Six (67%) 4-year-olds, 9 (69%) 5-
year-olds, and 12 (92%) 6-year olds performed the prospective memory task. There were 
no significant differences in the extent to which children at different ages remembered to 
perform the prospective memory task when given the prospective memory instructions, χ2 
(2, N = 35) = 0.11, p = .78. 
Accuracy on the ongoing task. A 2 (phase: phase 1, phase 2) x 2 (condition: 
control, prospective memory) x 3 (age: 3-, 4-, 5-year olds) mixed Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted on ongoing task accuracy performance, where phase was a 
within-subjects variable. In this and all subsequent analyses, the prospective memory trial 
was excluded because executing the prospective memory task would affect performance 
on the ongoing task (McDaniel & Einstein, 2009; Smith, 2003). Accuracy scores were 
calculated with the total number of correct trials for each phase divided by the total 
number of trials per phase (14 trials phase) to yield a proportion. There was no effect of 
phase, F (1, 80) = 1.992, p = .16, or condition, F (1, 80) = .032 , p =. 86.  However, there 
was a trend towards an effect of age, F (2, 80) = 2.417, p = .10, such that 6-year-olds had 
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better accuracy performance than 4- and 5-year-olds. To characterize some of the errors 
that were made, 8 children (seven 4-year olds and one 6-year old) pressed the smiley face 
for all trials in phase 2. These children were excluded from the current and all subsequent 
analyses.  Also, 2 children (two 4-year-olds) responded randomly to the ongoing task in 
phase 2.  Lastly, 7 children (one 4-year old, three 5-year-olds, and three 6-year-olds) 
made simple ongoing selection task mistakes such as selecting the incorrect picture or 
pressing the smiley face on the incorrect trial. 
Response latencies on the ongoing task. Analyses were conducted using only 
response times on correct trials because other processes are thought to be involved in 
incorrect trials which might slow down response times (cf. Smith & Bayen, 2007). First, 
the average response times (trials 1-11 and 13-15) was submitted to a 2 x 2 x 3 (phase x 
condition x age) mixed ANOVA, where phase was a within-subjects variable (see Figure 
2). Not surprisingly, there was a main effect of age, F (2, 80) = 6.957, p = .00. A Tukey’s 
HSD analysis at the .05 level revealed 4-year-olds were significantly slower on ongoing 
task trials than 5- and 6-year-olds, but 5- and 6-year-olds did not differ from one another. 
There was also an effect of phase, F (1, 80) = 4.720, p = .03, and a main effect of 
condition, F (1, 80) = 9.590, p = .00.  The main effects were qualified by the phase x 
condition interaction, F (1, 80) = 10.054, p = .00, suggesting that children in the control 
condition were significantly faster in phase 2. 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Response times for each age group by phase and condition for trials 1 through 
15; 4C = 4-year-old control condition; 5C = 5-year-old control condition; 6C = 6-year-old 
control condition; 4E = 4-year-old control experimental condition; 5E = 5-year-old 
experimental condition; 6E = 6-year-old experimental condition. 
 
 
 
It was hypothesized that the trials after the target may have drastically different 
response times; therefore, the analyses were also conducted excluding the three trials 
following the prospective memory target to ensure that the cost in the prior analyses was 
not an artifact of these trials. A 2 x 2 x 3 (phase x condition x age) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on response latency difference scores, where phase was a within-subjects 
variable. The analyses were conducted using the first 11 trials before the PM target trial 
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(see Figure 3). In this analysis, there was an effect of age, F (2, 80) = 6.861, p = .00.  A 
Tukey’s HSD analysis at the .05 level revealed that 4-year-olds were significantly slower 
than 5- and 6-year-old children.  Five- and 6-year-olds did not significantly differ from 
each other. There was also an effect of condition, F (1, 80) = 9.895, p = .00. Phase 
interacted with condition, F (1, 80) = 8.70, p = .00, indicating that reaction times for 
children in the prospective memory condition were longer in phase 2 than the reaction 
times for children in the control condition.  As expected the children in the control 
condition demonstrated considerable practice effects, speeding up on the ongoing task 
performance in phase 2.  
 
Figure 3. Response times for each age group by phase and condition for trials 1 through 
11; 4C = 4-year-old control condition; 5C = 5-year-old control condition; 6C = 6-year-old 
control condition; 4E = 4-year-old control experimental condition; 5E = 5-year-old 
experimental condition; 6E = 6-year-old experimental condition. 
 
26 
 
 
Response times differences between children who remembered and those who 
forgot to perform the prospective memory task. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 (phase x condition x age x 
remember) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the average response time from phase 1 
and the average response time from phase 2. There was no significant main effect of 
children who remembered and those did not remember to perform the prospective 
memory instructions, F (1, 31) = 2.497, p = .12. In other words, children’s response times 
did not differ between those who performed the prospective memory actions and those 
who neglected to perform the prospective memory instructions.  
“Free-up” hypothesis. The analyses for the “free-up” hypothesis examined 
whether children’s performance after the prospective memory target was significantly 
faster than their performance before the target trial.  Included in this analysis were the 3 
trials prior to the prospective memory target and the 3 remaining trials following the 
prospective memory target (see Figure 4). A 2 x 2 x 3 (pre-/post-PM trial x condition x 
age) mixed ANOVA was conducted, where pre-/post-PM trial was a within-subjects 
variable. There was an effect of condition, F (1, 78) = 12.105, p = .00, with response 
times being slower in the experimental condition and age, F (2, 78) = 3.922, p = .02. A 
Tukey’s HSD analyses showed that 6-year old children were faster than 4-year olds, but 
5- and 6-year olds did not significantly differ. Overall, children in all conditions were 
slower after the 12th trial (after the prospective memory trial for those in the experimental 
condition). Also, children in the experimental condition had significantly slower response 
times after the prospective memory trial. The pre-/post-PM trial by condition interaction 
was significant, F (1, 78) = 4.11, p = .05, suggesting that those in the prospective 
27 
 
 
memory condition were slower after the prospective memory trial than those in the 
control condition. 
 
Figure 4. Free up hypothesis. Response times for each age group by pre-/post-target trial 
and condition for trials 9 through 11 and trials 13 through 15 in phase 2; 4C = 4-year-old 
control condition; 5C = 5-year-old control condition; 6C = 6-year-old control condition; 
4E = 4-year-old control experimental condition; 5E = 5-year-old experimental condition; 
6E = 6-year-old experimental condition. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
Prospective memory is needed while in the midst of other activities. The current 
study was designed to examine how performance on these other activities are affected 
when children are given a concurrent prospective memory task. Consistent with Smith’s 
(2003) claim that prospective memory will impair ongoing task performance, it was 
hypothesized that children who were given a prospective memory task would show costs 
through accuracy as well as response times relative to children who were not given the 
prospective memory instructions. Results from the current study suggest that children do 
demonstrate a cost to ongoing task performance by slowed response times but not 
accuracy on the ongoing task. The current study supports Smith’s (2003) claim that 
prospective memory impairs ongoing task performance. Furthermore, these results 
challenge Einstein and McDaniel’s (1996) claim that a cost should only be demonstrated 
when a prospective memory cue (i.e., duck or apple) occurs and not throughout ongoing 
task performance. Though all children who had to perform the prospective memory task 
demonstrated a cost relative to children who did not have to hold prospective memory 
instructions in mind, 6-year-olds’ pattern of performance was similar to the cost 
demonstrated by adults (Smith, 2003). Specifically, adults do not slow down in phase 2 
performance, but generally do not benefit from practice effects, much like the 6-year-old 
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children in the current study (Smith, 2003; Smith et al, 2007). This similarity exists by 
way of response time and accuracy, suggesting that by 6-years of age, children begin 
toengage in preparatory attentional processes in the same manner as adults. Conversely, 
4-year-old children seem to be benefiting from practice effects. This may be because 
children are not monitoring for the prospective memory target; therefore, a cost is not 
imposed to the ongoing task.  Five-year-olds seem to be the most impaired by the 
prospective memory instructions, such that their performance was slower in phase 2 of 
the prospective memory condition.  These pattern of results suggest a developmental shift 
such that younger children do not monitor for the prospective memory target, instead they 
are rather reactive when they perform the action.  By 5 years of age, children may begin 
to monitor but have such little experience in doing so, such that monitoring drastically 
slows performance compared to older children. However, when children reach 6 years of 
age, they are able to monitor for the ongoing cue without extreme detriments to their 
ongoing task performance. 
If WMC is indicative of the amount of information individuals can attend to, then 
it may account for the extent to which children are impaired on the task. Specifically, as 
children become older, they should have greater resources and capacity to perform 
multiple processes such as monitoring and task switching. Smith and Bayen (2005) found 
that WMC is predictive of individuals’ ability to engage in preparatory attentional 
processes. WMC is thought to play an important role in tasks requiring executive 
functions such as attention, task switching, and monitoring (Bjorklund, 2000).  Each of 
these skills is critical when performing a prospective memory task as one must maintain 
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attention on current tasks while monitoring for the prospective memory cue.  Further, 
task switching is important to prospective memory, as individuals must switch their 
responding from the current task to perform a prospective memory task. Dempster (1991) 
reported that on a digit span task – a typical measure of working memory – children’s 
span increase steadily during childhood. Therefore, as children become older, their WMC 
expands such that they are able to attend to and store a growing amount of information at 
once.  
Speed of processing may also play a role in the current study.  As children age, 
myelination of nerve cells in the brain may help quicken children’s responding to and 
learning of unfamiliar information (Bjorklund, 2000).  Kail (1991, 1997) has found that 
from 6 to 21 years of age, processing speed increases, which he attributed to a greater 
number of processing resources that are available as individuals age. Processing 
resources may be important in such tasks that require individuals to perform and divide 
their attention between concurrent tasks.  In prospective memory tasks, a greater number 
of resources should allow individuals to attend to an ongoing task while monitoring for a 
prospective memory cue, doing so with less impairment as they age.  Six-year-old 
children in the current study were less impaired than the younger age groups, which is 
consistent which a developmental view of processing speed.  Older children seem to have 
more resources available to them, such that adding a prospective memory task impairs 
performance to a lesser extent than for younger children. Future research should examine 
this in children to see if a similar pattern exists. On the other hand, it may be that WMC 
is a less predictive measure for children, which may be implied by the current study.  
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Children could be considered low-span individuals compared to adults.  If children are 
low-spans, then they should have demonstrated less cost with age, as WMC is thought to 
develop with age. This would suggest that children’s WMC spans are decreasing with 
age, which is unlikely.  To examine this question more closely, a measure of WMC 
capacity should be collected in conjunction with a prospective memory task.   
It was also hypothesized that if children engage in preparatory attentional 
processes, reaction times should become less impaired after the prospective memory task 
has passed because they are no longer having to monitor for an upcoming cue related to 
the prospective memory action. This was not supported by the current study. Results 
showed that reaction time performance became even more impaired than before the target 
trial.  One possible explanation for this finding is that after children are reflecting on their 
prospective memory performance after the trial has passed (cf. Marcovitch & Zelazo, in 
press). In other words, when the target trial appears, children are explicitly reminded of 
the rule, which elicits reflection.  Even though the children have been told they will only 
see the target once and the trial has passed, children cannot help themselves from 
monitoring and engaging in preparatory attentional processes.  
The Hierarchical Competing Systems Model (HCSM) provides a useful 
developmental framework for changes in executive function. The model is used to 
explain perseverative errors on executive function tasks through the  increased likelihood 
of reflecting on a given response over the lifespan (Marcovitch & Zelazo, in press). 
Further, this model assumes that goal-directed behavior, for which executive function is 
involved, is under the control of two systems: a habit system and a representational 
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system.  The habit system is under the influence of previous experiences, while the 
representational system influences the development of reflection in early childhood. 
Moreover, the representational system is thought to aid in overriding habit-based 
responses through reflection.  In regards to prospective memory and ongoing tasks costs, 
the cost observed in the current study might be understood from the HCSM framework.  
In phase 1, participants are given 15 trials for which they build up a habit for performing 
the ongoing task.  However, when participants in the experimental condition in phase 2 
are given the instructions to perform the prospective memory task, because they have 
built up a habit to performing the ongoing task, they may be forced to reflect upon their 
actions to perform the prospective memory task. This increased reflection may translate 
to increased reaction times (i.e., cost) on the ongoing task in phase 2 of the prospective 
memory condition. This model also assumes that the likelihood of reflection increases 
with age, such that younger children may be less likely to do so than older children.  This 
prediction may also explain age related changes in cost observed in the current study.  
Four-year-olds seem to demonstrate little cost to the ongoing task when given the 
prospective memory instructions, whereas 5- and 6-year-olds did demonstrate a cost.  
Therefore, the cost observed in older children may be due to reflection. 
Similarly, Zelazo (2004) proposed that age-related changes in executive function 
could be understood in terms of  ‘levels of consciousness’ (LOC).  Further, this model 
maintains that higher LOC’s are brought about through effortful, resource demanding 
processes. The Cognitive Complexity and Control (CCC) theory also is a framework that 
aims to explain developmental changes in executive function (Zelazo, Muller, Frye, & 
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Marcovitch, 2003). Changes in executive functions from this theory are thought to be a 
result of improvements in the rule-based structures, where children develop the ability to 
use more complex, higher-order rules requires that individuals reflect on conflicting 
rules. Zelazo suggests that to form a higher-order rule to integrate conflicting rules, 
individuals have to acquire a higher LOC, which he termed as reflective consciousness. 
Prospective memory may also require the use of rules and higher LOCs.  More 
specifically, if children are to perform a prospective memory task that is embedded in an 
ongoing task, the prospective memory cues can be construed as a part of the ongoing task 
or as a cue for the prospective memory action. Therefore, the formation of the higher 
order rule (i.e. When I see animals, I should press the animal, but if I see a duck, I should 
press smiley) may require reflective consciousness.  Further, because the acquisition and 
use of higher LOCs are thought to be resource-demanding, the result may be slowed 
performance on the ongoing task. In the current study, older children in the prospective 
memory condition had faster reaction times and were less impaired on the ongoing task.  
These findings are consistent with the LOC model as well as the CCC theory which 
suggests that, though the use of the processes are demanding, the demands lessen with 
age, as higher LOCs are more easily acquired. 
In a practical sense, if children do experience impairments to their current tasks, 
then it may be important to minimize the cognitive load by providing memory aids or 
reminders.  The aforementioned study by Kliegel and Jager (2007) found that children as 
young as 3-years of age performed better on the prospective memory task when given a 
memory aid.  As of yet, there have been no studies that have examined how a memory 
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aid or reminder may improve performance or decrease the cost on a concurrent task that 
may be imposed when given a prospective memory intention.  It may be that the addition 
of a memory aid may decrease the demand on cognitive resources, therefore, alleviating 
the impairment to the current task. 
Prospective memory is clearly linked to the concept of goal neglect. Duncan et al. 
(1996) described goal neglect as a “slip of the mind” phenomenon. Goal neglect certainly 
plays a role in prospective memory. Therefore, when individuals know to perform the 
prospective memory action but fail to do so at the appropriate time, individuals have 
engaged in a form of goal neglect (Maylor, 1998). Because of the similarity and the 
likelihood of goal neglect in prospective memory, it cannot be for certain that prospective 
memory and goal neglect are not one of the same. However, in regard to the current 
study, the results suggest that even though children neglect to perform the prospective 
memory task, they do not display less of a cost than those who did remember to do so.  
Therefore, neglecting and remembering to perform the prospective memory task may not 
have differential cost impacts in regard to the ongoing task. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
There were a number of limitations in the present research.  First, children in the 
control condition did not receive instructions for the prospective memory task.  
Therefore, the differences examined between the control and prospective memory 
condition might have been due to the additional instructions about the prospective 
memory task, rather than the intention to perform the task.  However, evidence with adult 
populations suggests the cost to the ongoing task is not due to participants receiving the 
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instructions (Smith et al., 2007).  The cost was only demonstrated when participants were 
given the instructions and told the carry out the prospective memory task. This still needs 
to be demonstrated with children to rule it out as a possible alternative interpretation. 
In a similar vein, it is also important that one examines the nature of preparatory 
attentional processes in children.  For example, it may be that children are more reactive 
rather than proactive in their monitoring (cf. Chatham, Frank, & Munakata, 2008).  
One reason that costs might exist in children is that they are retaining intentions in short-
term storage but not necessarily proactively monitoring the ongoing task for the 
prospective memory cue.  To address this question, one can draw upon the work of Smith 
et al. (2007) and utilize a similar design where there is a control condition (no 
instructions), a prospective memory instruction condition (instructions only, no 
intention), and a prospective memory condition (instructions and intention). If children 
are reactive, then children in the prospective memory instructions condition and the 
prospective memory condition should not differ. Chatham et al. might argue that though 
the prospective memory condition and the prospective memory instructions condition are 
displaying a cost on the ongoing task compared to the control condition, this cost might 
be due to remembering the instructions, not to monitoring for the prospective memory 
cue. A second possibility may be that children do proactively monitor. A pattern of 
results that might support this alternative hypothesis would be if children in the 
prospective memory condition demonstrated a greater cost to the ongoing task than 
children in the prospective memory instructions condition. Also, both of these conditions 
should be slower on the ongoing task than children in the control condition. Therefore, it 
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may be that remembering the instructions does impose a cost to the ongoing task in the 
prospective memory instructions condition, but the intention and the resources needed to 
monitoring the ongoing task for the prospective memory cue imposes an even greater 
cost. 
Another limitation of the current study may be that a salient cue, the smiley face, 
was presented on all trials. It is possible that may have slowed down children who were 
instructed to attend to it. A task that does not require the presence of this salient cue on 
each trial may be more appropriate (Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2007). For instance, a task 
that requires children to press a button on the keyboard may be less salient and impose 
less of a cost to the ongoing task. It may be that because children have a smaller WMC in 
general, they displayed a cost because the stimulus (i.e., smiley face) was present on all 
trials, which required attention and may have placed a greater demand on their working 
memory.  However, there was not a cost imposed on the control condition even though 
the smiley face was present.  This may be because children in the control condition were 
not told why the smiley face was present, therefore, it was not a salient cue for those 
children. 
In previous studies on prospective memory, the environmental context has proved 
to have significant effects on performance on a prospective memory task. A study by 
Ceci and Bronfrenbrenner (1983) found that children performed better on a time-based 
prospective memory task when in a familiar environment rather than a laboratory 
contrived setting.  Similarly, Somerville et al. (1983) found that children as young as 2-
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years of age could perform a prospective memory task in a familiar setting while highly 
motivated. The cost may only occur in artificial lab tasks, and not in real world situations. 
Conclusions. The current study was aimed at determining whether prospective 
memory in children takes up cognitive resources and imposes a cost to activities 
surrounding a prospective memory task. Like adults, as children become older, they 
engage in preparatory attentional processes and display a cost to the ongoing task. These 
findings add to a growing body of research on prospective memory in children and the 
development of processes that may impose cognitive cost to activities surrounding 
prospective memory tasks. 
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